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Discipline de parti
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par

Joëlle Desjardins

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AMÉRIQUE LATINE

1. Ames, Barry. **Party discipline in the Brazilian Chamber of deputies**. In *Legislative politics in Latin America*. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002.
   JL 963 L514 2002 Biblio. Univ. Laval

2. Amorim-Neto, Octavio; Santos, Fabiano. **The executive connection : presidentially defined factions and party discipline in Brazil**. *Party Politics*. Vol. 7, no 2 (March 2001). P. 213-234

   « Comparative theories of legislatures have generally focused on the impact of electoral system-generated incentives on party discipline. While hypotheses advanced by this literature can explain cross-national variation in discipline, they fail to explain variation within the same country. This work explains the impressive cross-party and within-party variation in discipline observed in Brazil's first democracy (1946-1964). Party discipline was above all a function of presidents' legislative coalition-building strategies based on the dispensation of patronage to parties. One main consequence of these strategies was the creation of two factions within each party : one pro-presidential, the other anti-presidential. The relative size of each faction is assumed to affect discipline. Econometric analysis of 982 roll calls demonstrates that the key determinants of the discipline of the largest parties were the extent of budgetary resources channeled to them by presidents and the lapsing of the president's term. »

3. Desposato, Scott; Samuels, David. **The search for party discipline in the Brazilian Legislature and implications for comparative institutional research**. [S.l. : s.n.], 2003. 19 p.

   Prepared for delivery at the 2003 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas Texas, March 27-29.
   « Are Brazil's parties « weak and inchoate »? Or has the Brazilian party system consolidated since the return to democracy? Recent debate on the nature of Brazilian legislative parties pivots on the role that party leaders play in controlling backbenchers. In this paper, we review the tools that Brazilian party leaders can use to influence legislators and provide new tests on the relationship between party cohesion on roll-call votes and pork-barrel distribution. »

4. Jones, Mark. **Explaining the high level of discipline in the Argentine Congress**. In *Legislative politics in Latin America*. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002.
   JL 963 L514 2002 Biblio. Un. Laval

5. Nacif, Benito. **Understanding party discipline in the Mexican Chamber of**

deputies : the centralized party model. In *Legislative politics in Latin America*. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002.
JL 963 L514 2002 Biblio. Univ. Laval

AUSTRALIE

6. Mcallister, Ian. **Australia : party politicians as a political class**. In *The political class in advanced democracies*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003. P. 26-45
JF 51 P769 2003 Biblio. Un. Laval

   « The hallmark of the Australian political system is strong party control. The consequences of party control and party discipline for the recruitment, composition, organization, and outlook of Australia's political class are examined, both across the states and on the federal level. Party service and party loyalty are central requirements for entry into, and mobility within, the political class. Reform pressure is mainly pointed at establishing higher ethical standards of conduct, but will probably not result in fundamental changes for Australia's « party political class ».

AUTRES PAYS

7. Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. **Party discipline and universalism : the case of budgeting in Berlin**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 7, no 4 (Winter 2001). P. 37-62

   « Work on the US Congress has found that when partisan differences are strong, legislation tends to be passed by minimum winning coalitions. When partisanship is weak, Congress and its committees often rely on the norm of universalism or « giving something to everyone » to pass legislation. Universalism in legislative voting is expected to lead to bloated or inefficient public spending. This article investigates whether these hypotheses about party discipline and universalism hold true outside the United States. A comparison of fiscal decision-making in local legislatures in eastern Berlin, where newly created political parties are weakly disciplined, and in western Berlin, where established party caucuses are highly disciplined, finds this is indeed the case. The article concludes by raising questions for future research on universalism and other post-communist legislatures. »

8. Depauw, Sam. **Parliamentary party cohesion and the scarcity of sanctions in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives (1991-1995)**. *Res Publica*. Vol. 41, no 1 (1999). P. 15-39

   « Party cohesion is crucial in parliamentary proceedings, for the strength of

parties is determined by it. However high levels of party unanimity, parliamentary party cohesion is under no circumstances to be taken for granted. It is the outcome of persistent struggle. From a rational choice point of view, the monitoring and sanctioning of recalcitrant MPs by the parliamentary party leadership is the condition sine qua non for party cohesion. Yet, rewards and punishments do not seem the cement that holds parliamentary parties together. Preliminary findings for the Belgian Chamber of Representatives show that ministerial appointment, committee transfers, nor party list compilations are used systematically to this purpose. »

9. Montgomery, Kathleen A. **Electoral effects on party behavior and development : evidence from the Hungarian National Assembly**. *Party Politics*. Vol. 5, no 4 (October 1999). P. 4507-4523

   « The effort to achieve a more party-oriented set of House Rules in Hungary's newly democratized National Assembly provides evidence about the behavior and development of political parties in a transitional setting. Using data drawn from in-depth interviews, records of MP activities and minutes of plenary discussions, this paper chiefly finds that the distribution of mandates in Hungary's hybrid electoral system determined the relative cohesiveness of the emerging parties and that, as the system has settled down, new information on the electoral value of party cohesion has caused parties to adapt their behavior and rule preferences. »

CANADA

10. Cohn, Daniel. **Party discipline in Canadian federal politics : permanent decline or temporary disruption?** Burnaby, B.C., Simon Fraser University, Department of Political Science, 2003.

    Paper presented to the Biennial Meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Portland, Or.

11. Cross, Bill. **Les députés, les électeurs et la démocratie à la Chambre des communes canadienne**. Ottawa : Groupe canadien d'étude des questions parlementaires, 2000. 18 p.
    http://www.studyparliament.ca/French/PDF/crosscspgfrancais_3_f.pdf

    « Le Pr Cross commence son analyse en posant l'hypothèse que les députés se font reprocher avec raison de ne pas prendre l'initiative de débats de principe susceptibles de mettre leur point de vue en opposition avec celui de leur parti. La discipline de parti au Canada n'a jamais été contestée au cours des vingt dernières années malgré 1) une transformation radicale du régime des partis au Canada depuis l'élection de députés réformistes et bloquistes en 1993; 2) un renouvellement massif de la députation à la Chambre des

communes; et 3) une réforme de la procédure parlementaire qui donne aux députés militants une meilleure occasion d'exercer de l'influence. Le Pr Cross suppose ensuite que le problème des députés tient en partie au fait qu'ils n'obtiennent pas un mandat indépendant des autorités locales de leur parti lors de la procédure de mise en candidature. La plupart du temps, les assemblées d'investiture ont lieu à huis clos, sans qu'il y ait de débat sur les principes. Il arrive donc souvent que les candidats choisis n'arrivent pas à Ottawa forts de l'appui indéfectible de l'organisation locale de leur parti. Si les assemblées d'investiture étaient publiques et animées par des discussions de principe, ce serait un premier pas vers l'élection de députés qui ne craindraient pas de s'opposer aux dirigeants parlementaires. »

12. De Clercy, Christine. **Le maintien de la discipline de parti**. In *Les exigences du leadership de nos jours à la Chambre des communes*. Ottawa : Groupe canadien d'études des questions parlementaires, 2002. P. 10-13
B 2002 085

13. Docherty, David C. **Canada : political careers between executive hopes and constituency work**. In *The political class in advanced democracies*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003. P. 67-84
JF 51 P769 2003 Biblio. Un. Laval

« Members of the Canadian Parliament today are well-paid political professionals. Still, the most attractive goal of a national political career in Canada is a seat at the cabinet table, because only here members can influence public policy, assure their reelection, and control the parliamentary party. However, as the opportunity to serve in national cabinet is limited, most members of the Canadian political class spend their careers engaged in constituency service or remain at the provincial level. Reform efforts have for the most part been focussed on increasing MPs' input into policy making and greater freedom of voting, but the backbenchers have been reticent to challenge the general executive-centred nature of Canada's parliamentary system. »

14. Geddes, John. **Rise up, rise up : Liberal backbenchers challenge party discipline**. *Maclean's (Toronto ed.)*. (April 1 2002). P. 21

15. Guay, Monique. **La discipline de parti, la représentation des électeurs et les convictions personnelles**. *Revue parlementaire canadienne*. Vol. 25, no 1 (Printemps 2002). P. 7-9
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.parl.gc.ca/infoparl/francais/issue.htm?param=82&art=243

« Plusieurs motifs sont à l'origine de la décision d'une personne de se présenter lors d'une élection. Toutefois, tous les élus devront tôt ou tard choisir entre la discipline de parti, les besoins de leurs électeurs et leurs

convictions personnelles. Le présent article examine quelques aspects de ce dilemme. »

16. Hare, John Edward. **Making Parliament national : a burkean reverie**. *Options politiques*. Vol. 20, no 8 (Octobre 1999). P. 70-74
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct99/hare.pdf

« Peut-on soulager notre système politique du fléau des groupes d'intérêts? Le Parlement peut-il devenir une véritable institution nationale insensible aux intérêts particuliers et n'agissant qu'en fonction des intérêts nationaux? Les propositions actuelles de rendre les députés plus indépendants de leurs partis feraient du Parlement un congrès d'intérêts spéciaux. Nous avons besoin de la discipline fournie par les partis, mais pas des divisions qu'ils semblent nécessiter. La seule manière d'atteindre cet objectif, c'est de passer outre aux idées reçues. »

17. Kilgour, David; Kirsner, John; McConnell, Kenneth. **Discipline versus democracy : party discipline in Canadian politics.** In *Crosscurrents : contemporary political issues*. 4th ed. Scarborough : Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002.
FC635 C76 2002 Biblio. Un. McGill

18. Longley, Neil. **Legislative systems with absolute party discipline : implications for the agency theory approach to the constituent-legislator link**. *Public Choice*. Vol. 97, no 1-2 (October 1998). P. 121-140

« This paper examines how the presence of absolute party discipline forces one to re-examine some of the issues surrounding the constituent-legislator link. With absolute party discipline, slack at the individual district level is determined by the policy choices of a political party, rather than by the choices of the individual legislator. This party discipline not only has implications for the representational effectiveness of individual legislators, but also results in the terms « slack » and « shirking » no longer necessarily being synonymous. The empirical work shows that Canadian political parties engaged in wide scale shirking on the 1988 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.»

19. Rioux, Matthias. **Quelles sont les racines du malaise démocratique?** *Revue parlementaire canadienne*. Vol. 25, no 4 (Hiver 2002-2003). P. 9-12
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.parl.gc.ca/infoparl/francais/issue.htm?param=85&art=272

Voir la section intitulée : La discipline de parti, p. 11.

20. Strahl, Chuck. **Pour un Parlement plus à l'écoute des Canadiens**. *Revue parlementaire canadienne*. Vol. 24, no 1 (Printemps 2001). P. 2-4

Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.parl.gc.ca/infoparl/francais/issue.htm?param=78&art=201

Voir la section section intitulée : Vote libre, p. 2.

ÉTATS-UNIS

21. Ashworth, Scott; Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. **Endogenous party discipline with variable electoral and legislative institutions**. New York : New York University, Department of politics, 2004. 39 p.
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/ashworth.pdf

    « We study a simple model of party formation in which both party discipline and inter-party ideological heterogeneity are jointly determined. Discipline benefits party members because it gives risk-averse voters more confidence in the ideological composition of the party, but this discipline is costly to members who win office. Equilibrium is determined by balancing these forces. We show that this model can account for both comparative facts about parliamentary and presidential systems, and for changes over time in the U.S. Congress. »

22. Cox, Gary W.; Poole, Keith T. **On measuring partisanship in roll-call voting : the US House of Representatives, 1877-1999**. *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 46, no 3 (July 2002). P. 477-489

    « We propose a method of assessing party influence, based on a spatial model. Our method provides the first test of whether observed values of the widely-used Rice index of party dissimilarity are consistent with a « party-less » null model. Substantively, we find evidence of party influence in all but one Congress since 1877. Moreover, our indicator of party pressure is systematically higher for the sorts of roll calls that party theorists believe are more pressured - procedural, organizational, and label-defining votes. Our results refute the widespread notion that parties in the House have typically had negligible influence on roll-call voting behavior. They also document important changes in party influence associated with the packing of the Rules Committee in 1961 and the procedural reforms of 1973. »

23. Green, Matthew N. **Institutional change, party discipline, and the House Democratic caucus, 1911-1919**. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 27, no 4 (November 2002). P. 601-634

    « The House Democratic caucus of 1911 to 1919 is a largely understudied institution in the literature on congressional party government, despite the claims of many scholars that the caucus functioned as a significant instrument of party government by binding legislators' floor votes. An

analysis of roll-call votes, new data from the caucus journal, and contemporary accounts from the period indicate that these claims are largely exaggerated, although the caucus did, on occasion, improve floor discipline within the party. I find that intraparty homogeneity on crosscutting issues was related to caucus success. The adoption and use of the binding caucus can best be understood from the « multiple goals » viewpoint of congressional politics. These findings have important implications for understanding the development of party-based institutions in Congress. »

24. Grofman, Bernard; Koetzle, William; Merrill, Samuel. **Changes in the location of the median voter in the US House of Representatives, 1963-1996**. *Public Choice*. Vol. 106, no 3-4 (March 2001). P. 221-232

« We consider the degree of ideological polarization within and between the parties in the US House of Representatives for the period 1963-1996, using the T. Groseclose, S. Levitt and J. Snyder adjustment method for ADA and ACU scores [American Political Science Review vol. 93, no1, March 1999, p. 33-50] to ensure over time comparability of roll call voting data. We focus especially on the median House member, since we believe that change in the median offers a better measure of the impact of the change in party control than does changes in the mean roll-call voting score. Our data analysis makes two general points. (1) When we looked at the change in the location of the House median voter, we found a dramatic change after the Republicans gained a majority in the House in 1994 : the ADA median in the House in 1995-1996 was at 24, far closer to the Republican median of 4 than to the Democratic median of 83. The shift in median from 1993-1994 to 1994-1995 involved a change of over 25 points in one election - far and away the greatest single shift in ideology of the modern era. In contrast, the mean changed only 1 point over this same period. (2) For the three decades we investigated, we found three historical epochs vis-a-vis the relative locations of the ADA (or ACU) floor median and the ADA (or ACU) floor mean in the House - two inflection points in 1983 and 1994 which are related to trends in regional realignment. »

25. Hager, Gregory L.; Talbert, Jeffery C. **Look for the party label : party influences on voting in the US House**. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 25, no 1 (February 2000). P. 75-99

« Since party is so highly correlated with ideology, party-line voting in the US House may indicate members voting their own preferences. If, however, the reputation of a member's party is valuable as a cue for voters and other party supporters, then legislators should be willing to vote against their own preferences and for those of their party, at least sometimes. To investigate whether and how often this does occur, we use roll-call data from the House from the 1950s to 1990s to perform cross-sectional and other tests that isolate the effects of parties, including analyses of members who switch

parties. Our regression results indicate that party influence on voting has varied, but that there is an effect, even when controlling for ideology. »

26. **Internal pressures**. In *Guide to Congress*. 5th ed. Washington, D.C. CQ Press, 2000. P. 639-652
328.73 C749g 2000 1

27. Krehbiel, Keith. **The coefficient of party influence**. *Political Analysis*. Vol. 11, no 1 (Winter 2003). P. 95-103

« In a 2000 article, M. Snyder and T. Groseclose [Estimating party influence in congressional-roll-call voting, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 44, no 2, Apr. 2000, p. 193-211], develop and apply an innovative method for detecting and estimating the frequency and magnitude of party influence in congressional roll call voting. This paper presents a framework for assessing the coefficient that the authors interpret as « party influence ». The analysis reveals that, and shows why, the coefficient manifests two troublesome characteristics. The coefficient cannot discriminate between disparate types of party influence because the mapping between types of partisan influence and signs of the coefficient is not one-to-one. Similarly, the coefficient has a responsiveness problem because a marginal increase in one party's influence can cause the estimate of the coefficient to increase, decrease, or remain constant. Because the literature on parties in Congress emphasizes majority-party strength, the inability of the coefficient to isolate party-specific effects is a serious drawback in the ongoing hunt for genuine party discipline. »

28. Krehbiel, Keith. **Party discipline and measures of partisanship**. *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 44, no 2 (April 2000). P. 212-227

« This article employs a cutpoint model to analyze how five vote-based measures respond to changes in preference distributions and to different forms of behavior : party-based discipline and nonpartisan or undisciplined behavior. Three sets of findings are central to ongoing research about parties in legislatures. (1) The well-known and widely used party-voting score cannot discriminate between polar types of behavior. (2) All five measures encourage erroneous inferences of party discipline when only intraparty preference homogeneity may be present. (3) Of the four measures that can discriminate between partisan and nonpartisan behavior, historic congressional averages are often nominally high on a 0-100 scale, however, the averages tend to be closer to no-discipline expectations than to party-discipline expectations. Cumulatively, these findings suggest that, labels notwithstanding, vote-based measures of partisanship are ineffective instruments for detecting genuine party-based voting, party strength, and leadership support. »

29. **Leadership tactics**. In *Congress A to Z*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly, 1999. P. 260-261
328.73003 C749 1999 Réf.

30. Mason, J. L. **Majority party leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1977–96 : speakers, committee assignments, and institutional context**. *Social Science Quarterly*. Vol. 82, no 3 (September 2001). P. 569-582

« This paper describes and explains the presence of various strategies used by party leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives to increase cohesion among members of the majority party. Logistic regression analysis is performed on assignments to the most prestigious committees from the 95th through the 104th Congresses. Leaders are likely to reward loyal members, to favor no ideological wing of the majority party, and to protect—on occasion—the vulnerable members of the caucus. The implementation of these strategies varies according to short-term changes in the institutional context of the majority party. »

31. McCarty, Nolan; Poole, Keith T.; Rosenthal, Howard. **The hunt for party discipline in Congress**. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 95, no 3 (September 2001). P. 673-687

« We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll-call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator's ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the J. Snyder-T. Groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects. »

32. **Party unity**. In *Congress A to Z*. 3rd ed. Washington D.C. Congressional Quarterly, 1999. P. 329-330
328.73003 C749 1999 Réf.

33. Pearson, Kathryn. **A helping hand to the House floor : party discipline and legislative preference**. Berkeley : University of California, 2002. 24 p.
http://archive.allacademic.com/publication/getfile.php?file=docs/apsa_proceeding/2005-04-19/67477/apsa_proceeding_67477.pdf&PHPSESSID=05265948664e3287b476b1f89457d330

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston Marriott Copley Place, Sheraton Boston & Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts.

« This paper examines one potential mechanism party leaders have available for implementing discipline in a highly divided Congress. Using data concerning the consideration of members' legislation in the 106th Congress, it examines whether a member's party loyalty, electoral vulnerability, and institutional role are factors that party leaders take into account when deciding which members' legislation is considered on the House floor. The results show that loyalty is rewarded in certain legislative contexts, but the incentive to retain majority control of the House is a powerful constraint against leaders' use of legislative preference to achieve party discipline. »

34. Pearson, Kathryn. **Party discipline in the contemporary Congress : rewarding loyalty in theory and in practice**. University of Minnesota, Department of political science, 2005. 206 p.
http://www.msu.edu/~pipc/pipcspeakers.htm

« The United States Congress is not known for high levels of party discipline across time. From the fall of Speaker Cannon nearly a century ago to the reforms that enhanced Democratic leaders' power during the mid-1970s, the « textbook Congress » was characterized by strong, autonomous committee chairs and weak party leaders. Over the last three decades, parties have made a comeback and indeed structure conflict and power in the House of Representatives. Today, partisan conflict characterizes the legislative process, and competition for majority status shapes electoral politics every two years. As scholars document and debate the influence of parties in Congress, not enough attention has been devoted to the mechanisms of party discipline—the ways in which party leaders reward their members for their party loyalty when they allocate resources—and party leaders' willingness to use them. This is where my analysis begins. »

35. Snyder Jr, James M.; Groseclose, Tim. **Estimating party influence in congressional roll-call voting**. *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 44, no 2 (April 2000). P. 193-211

36. Snyder Jr, James M.; Groseclose, Tim. **Estimating party influence on roll call voting : regression coefficients versus classification success**. *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 95, no 3 (September 2001). P. 689-698

« Contrary to the claims of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, our method does not estimate the ideal points of moderates significantly less accurately than the ideal points of extremists. This is true for at least two reasons : (1) there is significant randomness in voting; as a consequence, on a lopsided vote moderates often vote with the extremists; and (2) our data set includes some roll calls that require a supermajority for passage; for these we define a 50%-50% roll call as lopsided. We also show that the classification-success method of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal severely understates the presence of party influence. Furthermore, we show that a proper interpretation of

some of their results reveals a significant amount of party influence in Congress. »

ÉTUDES COMPARATIVES OU GÉNÉRALES

37. Ashworth, Scott; Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. **Party discipline with electoral and institutional variation**. [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. 43 p.
http://bdm.wustl.edu/papers.html

Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association.
« There is substantial variation in party discipline and legislative cohesion, both across nations and over time. We study a model of party formation in which party discipline and inter-party ideological heterogeneity are endogenously and jointly determined. Discipline benefits party members because it enhances the informativeness of the party label. However, discipline is costly to members who win ounce because they are legislatively constrained. The model allows us to examine how the level of party discipline and the ideological composition of the party respond to changes in both the institutional and electoral environments. We find that the level of discipline and ideological homogeneity are decreasing in the power of the executive branch and are increasing in the ideological balance of electoral districts. While highly stylized, the model yields comparative statics that are broadly consistent with a variety of empirical trends observed in the literature and several testable hypotheses. »

38. Bowler, Shaun. **Parties in legislatures**. In *Parties without partisans*. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2000. P. 157-180
JF 2051 P3723 2000 Biblio. Un. Laval

« Assesses the degree to which parties still structure the legislative process. Party cohesion and party dominance within legislatures has usually been grounded in one of two explanations. One explanation sees legislative party discipline as a feature of the importance of party organization in fighting elections, which carries through to the legislative chamber itself, while a second explanation sees party discipline as a product of incentives facing individual legislators inside the legislative arena. The first argument would predict that party discipline inside the legislature should begin to falter because of the changes described in the previous chapters of this book. The second argument would predict that very little change should be seen and, further, that formal rules inside legislatures should underpin the importance of parties. In examining a range of behavioural data, such as roll-call voting and internal Rules of Procedure, there is little evidence to support the view that party discipline has weakened or that parties are less important today in determining legislative outcomes. Changes in electoral behaviour, then, are

not reflected in changes in the importance of parties inside legislatures where parties remain dominant actors. »

39. Carey, John M. **Discipline, accountability, and legislative voting in Latin America**. *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 35, no 2 (January 2003). P. 191-211

« Accountability in legislative representation carries implications for the relationship between legislators and constituents regarding communication, information, responsiveness, and the potential for punishment. There is an inherent tension between party discipline and responsiveness by individual legislators to their constituents. Recent institutional reforms in Latin America have sought to increase individual responsiveness of legislators, even at the expense of party discipline. The most important are mixed electoral systems combining single member districts with proportional representation and public voting in legislatures. »

40. Colomer, Josep P. **Policy making in divided government : a pivotal actors model with party discipline**. Barcelona : Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, 2005. 31 p.
http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/817.pdf

« This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce « gridlock », that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work. »

41. Cornwall, Tom. **Party discipline : can't live with it, can't live without it : submission to the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, August 12, 2004**. Vancouver : Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2004. 8 p.
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/submissions/csharman-10_0408181103-732.pdf

« The purpose of this submission is to discuss problems surrounding party discipline. This may appear to be only peripherally related to the

Assembly's purpose, but the mandate of the Assembly stipulates that the Assembly must « take into account the effect of its assessment on government, the Legislative Assembly, and political parties ». Electoral reform can potentially affect parties in three ways : It can change the optimal party size or it can change the optimal level of party discipline. These properties are not unrelated, but as much has been written and submitted about the advantages that certain systems give to small parties or to large ones, this submission will consider the effect of a possible electoral system change on the level of party discipline. For the purposes of this document, party discipline is the ability of the leadership of a party to control the actions of the legislators of that party. To investigate party discipline I will consider why it exists, why it is disliked, and what would happen if it were weakened. »

42. Cox, Gary W. **The incentive to build legislative parties**. La Jolla, Ca : Department of Political Science, University of California, 2002. 23 p.
http://www.yale.edu/las/conference/papers/gary_cox.pdf

Paper prepared for delivery at the Conference on Political Parties and Legislative Organization in Parliamentary and Presidential Regimes (Yale University, March 2002).
« This essay reviews how differing structural relationships between the executive and legislative branches of government affect the payoff to building cohesive voting blocs in the assembly, especially those that comprise a majority. I first identify the costs and benefits of producing cohesion. Assuming that the expected benefits must exceed the costs leads to observations about both the level of cohesion in given legislative groups (factions, parties, coalitions) and the size distribution of legislative groups. The main theme is simply that, as the national assembly's ability to control offices and powers declines, political entrepreneurs' incentives to build legislative parties decline as well. This theme subsumes both the traditional observation of lower cohesion in presidential than parliamentary systems and several other observations of a similar nature. »

43. Crooks, Nathan. **Party discipline and responsible government : ideas for reform**. Toronto : University of Toronto, 2003. 15 p.
http://www.nathancrooks.com/Pol214-1.htm

« In the pages that follow, I will begin by thoroughly analyzing the pros and cons of party discipline and its relation to the idea of responsible government in Canada. I will then address various reforms in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, whose examples are more relevant to the Canadian experience than the United States and the congressional system it employs. Finally, I will conclude with the suggestion that it is not the Parliamentary system itself that needs to be drastically reformed, but rather the attitudes and power structures that exist

inside of the system. Various reforms occurring on the caucus level, for example, could be far more effective and still leave the idea of responsible government in place. »

44. Hamer, David. **Passing laws : lower houses as legislatures**. In *Can responsible government survive in Australia?* 2nd ed. Canberra : Department of the Senate, 2004. P. 173-220
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/hamer/chap06.htm

45. Heller, William B. **Political denials : the policy effect of intercameral partisan differences in bicameral parliamentary systems**. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. Vol. 17, no 1 (April 2001). P. 34-61

46. Iaryczower, Matias. **Contestable leaderships : party discipline and vote buying in legislatures**. Los Angeles : University of California, 2004. 42 p.
http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~miaryc/Contestable_111404.pdf

« This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties : what tools enable a party leader to induce her party to support an unpopular position? The model formalizes the tradeoff between resources at the leader's discretion, and the incumbent's need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading. I show that contrary to conventional wisdom, promises of future partisan benefits (such as nominations to party lists) are insufficient to grant significant power to the party leader. Unless a majority of the party agrees (ex ante) with the incumbent's preferred position, future resources are valuable to the incumbent only if she also distributes benefits on the spot, or if she is protected by a supermajority requirement for removal. Moreover, I show that there is a complementarity between benefits distributed on the spot and the value of promises of future benefits, and that the multiplier effect of current resources is higher the more vulnerable the leader is to internal threats. As a result, more vulnerable leaders will allocate more current resources to buy members of their own party instead of the opposition. »

47. Kam, Christopher J. **Do ideological preferences explain parliamentary behaviour? Evidence from Great Britain and Canada**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 7, no 4 (Winter 2001). P. 89-126

« Are parliamentary parties cohesive because leaders successfully impose discipline on their MPs or because MPs prefer - hence support - the same policies as their leaders do? If the latter is correct, and party cohesion is produced largely by members' concordant preferences, then models that explain cohesion as a function of the disciplinary mechanisms available to parties once the MP is in Parliament (for example, the distribution of patronage or the threat of de-selection) are not useful. This article uses British and Canadian MPs' responses to candidate surveys to estimate MPs' positions on a variety of ideological dimensions and then shows that MPs'

preferences on these ideological dimensions only partially explain how often they vote against their parties. Indeed, even after one controls for an MP's ideological preferences, party affiliation remains a powerful predictor of the MP's loyalty or dissent - suggesting that party discipline does, in fact, contribute to cohesion. Additional tests indicate that these results are not spurious. »

48. Kam, Christopher J. **Parliaments, parties, and MPs : a comparative perspective on backbench dissent, party discipline, and intra-party politics**. Ann Arbor, Michigan : University Microfilm International, 2002. 270 p.
328.366 K15 2002
4 microfiches.

Thèse de Ph.D., University of Rochester.

49. Laver, Michael. **Divided parties, divided government**. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 24, no 1 (February 1999). P. 5-29

Également paru dans le livre intitulé : Legislatures : comparative perspectives on representative assemblies. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002, p. 201-223.
« The U.S. phenomenon of divided government has its counterpart in a parliamentary system as a result of the politics of coalition. One legislative coalition may put the executive in place, a different legislative coalition may sustain it in a vote of confidence, while yet another legislative coalition enacts measures that thwart its day-to-day business. I explain such division between executive and legislature by relaxing the party-as-unitary-actor assumption and recognise that executive and legislative elements of the same party may pursue different strategies. Party leaders may enter into commitments to coalition partners that involve implicit or explicit obligations to impose intraparty discipline. Leaders may do this with greater or lesser enthusiasm, and the required discipline may or may not be forthcoming. Thus, governments may be defeated in legislative votes because the legislature fails to honour obligations entered into by the executive. This paper sets out a simple model of this process, begins to analyse it, and elaborates a recent real-world example of the phenomenon. »

50. Longley, Neil. **Modeling the legislator as an agent for the party : the effects of strict party discipline on legislator voting behavior**. *Contemporary Economic Policy*. Vol. 21, no 4 (October 2003). P. 490-499
http://cep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/21/4/490

« This article argues that in legislative systems where absolute party discipline is present, the only means by which a legislator can dissent from the party position is to abstain from voting. It is argued that abstentions are more likely to occur where the party-imposed position causes conflict for the legislator—either because the party-imposed position conflicts with the

interests of the legislator's constituents or because it conflicts with the legislator's personal ideology. The hypothesis is empirically tested by examining voting in the Canadian House of Commons on the bill to implement the politically controversial Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement. The empirical results lend general support to the theoretical notions. »

51. Morgenstern, Scott. **Patterns of legislative politics : roll-call voting in Latin America and the United States**. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004. 224 p.
JL 1863 M851 2004 Biblio. Univ. Laval

52. **Party discipline and parliamentary government**. Columbus : Ohio State University Press, 1999. 304 p.
328.375094 P275 1995

« Based on papers presented at a workshop which was part of the European Consortium for Political Research's joint sessions in France in 1995 »

53. Skjæveland, Asbjorn. **A Danish party cohesion cycle**. *Scandinavian Political Studies*. Vol. 22, no 2 (1999). P. 121-136

« The aim is to analyze short-term fluctuations in Danish parliamentary party cohesion on the backdrop of an American electoral pattern in party cohesion. A Danish cycle is documented : party cohesion in relation to voting behavior is especially high just after an election, then it drops to rise again as election time approaches. A rational choice re-election model predicts the rise in party cohesion, but an obligation actualization model predicts the full cycle. Elections actualize Danish MPs' moral obligation to their party. Where American party cohesion drops in an election year, Danish party cohesion rises when an election approaches. This may be explained by different preferences in the American and Danish electorates : Danish voters value party cohesion per se, American voters do not. »

54. **Special issue on cohesion and discipline in legislatures : political parties, party leadership, parliamentary committees and governance**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 9, no 4 (Winter 2003). P. 1-178

Dépouillement : Does cohesion equal discipline? Towards a conceptual delineation. Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures : purposiveness and contexts. Legislative cohesion and presidential policy success. Cohesion without discipline : party voting in the House of Lords. Committee cohesion and the « corporate dimension » of parliamentary committees : a comparative analysis. The development of party discipline in new parliaments : Eastern German state legislatures 1990-2000. Party cohesion and party discipline in German parliaments. High discipline, low cohesion? The uncertain patterns of Canadian parliamentary party groups. Government party discipline in parliamentary

democracies : the cases of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom in the 1990s. Party discipline and government imposition of restrictive rules. Cohesion and discipline revisited : contingent unity in the parliamentary party group.

GRANDE-BRETAGNE

55. **Party discipline in Parliament and communication between parties**. In *Summary of Proceedings : 53nd Westminster Parliamentary Seminar 2004*. London : Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Secretariat, 2004. P. 22-24
http://www.cpahq.org/WestminsterSeminar2004_pdf_media_public.aspx

56. **Party discipline in Parliament and communication between parties**. In *Summary of Proceedings : 52nd Westminster Parliamentary Seminar 2003*. London : Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Secretariat, 2003. P. 21-22
http://www.cpahq.org/WestminsterSeminar2003_pdf_media_public.aspx

ITALIE

57. Ferrara, Federico. **Frogs, mice and mixed electoral institutions : party discipline in Italy's XIV Chamber of Deputies**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 10, no 4 (Winter 2004). P. 10-31
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ferrara/FrogsAndMice.pdf

« Through the analysis of nearly 5,700 electronic votes cast by members of the Italian lower house, this article focuses on the electoral incentives shaping legislative behaviour in assemblies elected under mixed electoral rules. The study finds that the incentives indirectly engendered by the interaction between the majoritarian and proportional components of the Italian mixed system strengthen party discipline, which is high for every legislator type regardless of mandate and specialisation. Legislators elected in single-member districts are equally, if not more, susceptible to pressures to stick to the party line as their colleagues elected from a party list. Moreover, indicators of « electoral path », like relative seat safety and dual candidacy, matter to party discipline more than simple seat type. »

58. Newell, James L. **Turning over a new leaf? Cohesion and discipline in the Italian Parliament**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 6, no 4 (2000). P. 29-52

« The literature on parties suggests various hypotheses about the conditions under which the cohesion and discipline of parliamentary parties will be

greater or lesser. Since one such hypothesis concerns party-system characteristics, Italy offers an opportunity to investigate what happens to cohesion and discipline when a system characterised by the permanence in office of a large, centrally located party and based on the permanent exclusion of left and right extremes, is replaced by one characterised by strong bi-polar tendencies and the alternation in office of two competing coalitions. Italy's transformation appears to have produced more cohesive and disciplined behaviour in parliament. »

PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN

59. Carrubba, Clifford; Gabel, Matthew. **Roll-call votes and party discipline in the European Parliament : reconsidering MEP voting behavior**. London : European Parliament Research Group, 1999. 33 p.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/EPRG/pdf/Working%20Paper%202.pdf

Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, Atlanta, Georgia.
« There are two predominant arguments made for why RCVs are requested in the EP : to position-take and to discipline votes. The position-taking explanations involve Party Group and/or national delegation leaders calling votes so that they can demonstrate to a third party, generally the public, the position of their group or delegation and/or the position of an opposing group or delegation on some issue. The disciplining explanation again focuses upon Party Group and/or national delegation leaders calling recorded votes, but this time so that they can ensure that their constituent membership votes the way the leader wants. The purpose of this paper is to make an initial cut at understanding : 1) to what degree these motivations lead to a potential selection-bias problem when looking at RCVs; and 2) to what degree there is preliminary evidence indicating that selection-bias is occurring. »

60. McElroy, Gail. **Committees and party cohesion in the European Parliament**. European Parliament Research Group, 2001. 44 p. (EPRG working paper : 8)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/EPRG/pdf/Working%20Paper%208.pdf

Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30, San Francisco, California.
« How do political parties enforce party discipline and promote cohesiveness in newly emerging legislatures? Parliamentary democracy and party discipline are conventionally viewed as synonymous. Political parties in established parliamentary democracies typically exhibit such high levels of unity that the question of how and why such discipline arises has, until recently, received little attention. But in emerging legislatures the process of transforming rudimentary party organisations into disciplined parties is not

inevitable. This paper will examine if the political groups in the European Parliament attempt to enforce party discipline. More specifically, the paper asks the question are MEPS who consistently vote against the party punished in terms of their committee assignments? »

61. Noury, Abdul G.; Roland, Gérard. **More power to the European Parliament?** *Economic Policy*. No 35 (October 2002). P. 279-320

« Many observers have expressed skepticism about granting more power to the EP, [because] MEPs vote more often with their country group than with their European party. Using a unique database consisting of all roll-call votes by each MEP between 1989 and 1999, we show that MEPs vote more along party lines than along country lines. Party cohesion is comparable to that of the US Congress and is increasing over time, whereas country cohesion is low and declining. In short, politics in the EP generally follows the traditional left-right divide that one finds in all European nations. These findings are valid across issues, even on issues like the structural and cohesion funds where one would expect country rather than party cohesion. In votes where the EP has the most power - those held under the so-called co-decision procedure - MEPs participate more and are more party-cohesive. »

62. Whitaker, Richard. **Party control in a committee-based legislature? The case of the European Parliament**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 7, no 4 (Winter 2001). P. 63-88

« Does a strong committee system reduce the ability of political parties to dominate a parliament? This article seeks to answer this question in the case of the European Parliament (EP). Specifically, the article assesses the extent to which party leaders control their committee members in the EP. On the basis of interviews with Members of the European Parliament, the article analyses : (1) the extent to which EP party group leaders control committee assignment and (2) how much influence they have over the direction of committee activities, specifically through group co-ordinators. The results show that national delegation leaderships are increasingly involved in directing the committee assignment process and that group co-ordinators, in some cases, are able to control committee business in the EP. »

QUÉBEC

63. **1045 rue des Parlementaires. [Émission 86, 9 avril 2001]**. Sainte-Foy : Télé-Québec, 2001.
C84T43 D58 86
Vidéocassette.

Un enjeu sur la ligne de parti. Est-ce que les députés ont le devoir de suivre scrupuleusement la ligne du parti qu'ils représentent? Comment vivent-ils les déchirements entre la ligne de leur parti et les demandes des citoyens de leur comté?

64. Québec (Province). Secrétariat à la réforme des institutions démocratiques. **Discipline de parti et votes libres**. In *La réforme parlementaire : cahier des propositions*. Québec : [Secrétariat à la réforme des institutions démocratiques], 2004. P. 18-19
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.bibliotheque.assnat.qc.ca/01/mono/2004/07/778127.pdf
A11R431 R43 2004

65. **Troisième plénière : Peut-on et doit-on faire échec à la ligne de parti et aux tenants d'une seule cause, la leur?** In *Colloque Le parlementarisme au XXIe siècle : 9 au 12 octobre 2002, Hôtel du Parlement, Québec*. Québec : Assemblée nationale du Québec, 2002.
http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fra/amicale/transcript4.htm

Participants à la plénière : Jacques Brassard, Gilles Lesage et Nathalie Rochefort. Président : Steeve LeBlanc.

Scandinavie

66. Damgaard, Erik. **Parliament and government**. In *Beyond Westminster and Congress : the Nordic experience*. Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University Press, P. 265-280
328.0948 B573 2000

67. Jensen, Torben K. **Party cohesion**. In *Beyond Westminster and Congress : the Nordic experience*. Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University Press, 2000. P. 210-236
328.0948 B573 2000

68. Skjæveland, Asbjorn. **Party cohesion in the Danish Parliament**. *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 7, no 2 (Summer 2001). P. 35-56

« This article formulates a comprehensive and systematic taxonomy of micro level explanations of party cohesion; party cohesion being understood as party group members acting in unity externally. This apparatus is used in an analysis of party cohesion in the final divisions in the Danish Parliament, where cohesion figures are among the highest in the liberal democratic world. The investigation is based on interviews, survey data and data on voting behaviour. The main explanations of the high level of cohesion are the absence of disagreement in the party groups and a moral commitment to the party. Variation among MPs, parties and topics is also documented and discussed. The cohesion of each party and the compliant behaviour of

individual MPs are related to the importance MPs ascribe to representing their party. Furthermore, divisions on moral issues, EU integration and local matters show lower than normal degrees of cohesion. »

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